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Massachusetts was one of seven sentinel surveillance sites in the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and
Surveillance Network. From 1996 through 2000, isolates from new patients with tuberculosis (TB) under-
went genotyping. We describe the impact that genotyping had on public health practice in Massachusetts
and some limitations of the technique. Through genotyping, we explored the dynamics of TB outbreaks,
investigated laboratory cross-contamination, and identified Mycobacterium tuberculosis strains, transmis-
sion sites, and accurate epidemiologic links. Genotyping should be used with epidemiologic follow-up to
identify how resources can best be allocated to investigate genotypic findings. 
enotyping of Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolates is
accepted as a useful tool in many public health settings
(1–13). Conventional epidemiology may be supported by anal-
ysis of isolates that cluster genetically by using IS6110 finger-
printing methods. Genotyping can confirm or disprove
previously known epidemiologic connections or suggest
unsuspected associations. We explore the impact that genotyp-
ing has had on public health practice in Massachusetts by
investigating the following premises. Genotyping plays an
indirect role in interrupting the transmission of tuberculosis
(TB) by identifying unexpected epidemiologic links and
unsuspected sites of transmission. By identifying and confirm-
ing outbreaks and their impact and aiding the investigation of
laboratory cross-contamination, genotyping determines
whether epidemiologic links found through conventional con-
tact investigations represent true cases of transmission. This
determination helps coordinators of TB-control programs to
direct and evaluate their program activities.
Before Massachusetts become one of seven sentinel sur-
veillance sites in the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and
Surveillance Network (genotyping network), M. tuberculosis
isolates were sent by the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health, Division of Tuberculosis Prevention and Control (TB
Division) to the regional laboratory (New York State Depart-
ment of Health’s Wadsworth Center in Albany, New York) for
genotyping on an as-needed basis. During the genotyping net-
work study (July 1, 1996–December 31, 2000), one isolate
from each new patient whose culture was positive for M.
tuberculosis was sent for genotyping (14).
Methods
Laboratory Methods
Cowan and Crawford (15) and Crawford et al. (16)
describe the laboratory protocol and design and methods of the
genotypying network. The Wadsworth Center performed
IS6110 restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) and
spoligotyping according to standardized procedures (16–18).
Genotype Cluster Identification
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
developed a standard protocol for cluster investigations. For
IS6110 strains with more than six copies in their fingerprint
patterns (high-copy strains), a single cluster designation was
allocated if two or more patients had isolates with identical
RFLP patterns. Strains with six or fewer copies in their pat-
terns (low-copy strains) were assigned a single cluster desig-
nation if two or more patients had both identical RFLP and
spoligotype patterns. The cluster investigation by the genotyp-
ing network took place from January 1, 1998, to December 31,
2000.
Epidemiologic Investigation of Clusters
To identify sources of transmission, we defined an epide-
miologic link as two persons who shared space or time. For
example, if a cluster included three persons (the source [A]
and two subsequent patients [B and C]), the epidemiologic
relationships identified for inclusion in the database would be
A to B and A to C. However, when a common source was
determined from outside the study, each relationship was
counted only once without reference to direction (B and C,
representing one link with no reference to A). An “expected
link” was one found through conventional contact investiga-
*Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Jamaica Plain, Massa-
chusetts, USA; †Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA; and
‡New York State Department of Health, Albany, New York, USA 
GTUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
1286 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 11, November 2002
tion, and an “unexpected link” was identified as a result of an
RFLP cluster investigation. 
To determine epidemiologic links, we reviewed medical
records from health departments, hospitals, and clinics for
each genotypically clustered case. Patients or their proxies
were interviewed. Collected data included medical informa-
tion (i.e., tuberculin skin-test results and BCG vaccine status,
potential exposures, and previous diagnoses), demographics,
and a 2-year social and work history. 
CDC collaborated with the genotyping network sentinel
sites in developing forms for data collection, patient consent,
and interviews. The Massachusetts Department of Public
Health institutional review board approved the protocol and
forms. The patient consent form was translated into Spanish,
Haitian Creole, Portuguese, Khmer, Vietnamese, and Chinese.
Interpreters were present during interviews, when needed. 
Laboratory Cross-Contamination
For the period 1994–1997, laboratory cross-contamination
or other error was suspected if more than one specimen pro-
cessed at the same time was positive for M. tuberculosis. At
the time, we considered that contamination was less likely to
occur between specimens processed in different batches on the
same day; therefore, this type of contamination was not
addressed in the study. Contamination in different batches
was, however, addressed in a broader 1998 genotyping net-
work study on laboratory cross-contamination. Data and meth-
ods from that study are described elsewhere (19).
Results
Transmission Dynamics and Public Health Implications
From July 1, 1996, to December 31, 2000, a total of 1,281
TB cases were counted in Massachusetts. Of these, 1,043
(81%) were culture confirmed as TB. Positive cultures were
obtained from 1,032 patients in Massachusetts, and 95% (984)
of the isolates obtained from these patients were genotyped.
The remaining isolates were not genotyped for various rea-
sons, including inability to obtain growth when subcultured,
contamination with other bacteria or fungi, and inability to
acquire isolates from outside laboratories. Of the 984 isolates,
776 (79%) had high-copy strains (seven or more IS6110 copies
in their patterns); 712 (72%) had unique DNA fingerprints;
272 (28%) aggregated into 82 clusters. Of 208 cases with low-
copy strains, 100 (48%) met the study definition of genotype
cluster. 
Links Established by Conventional Contact Investigation
Overall, 129 expected epidemiologic relationships in Mas-
sachusetts were identified. Of these, 37 relationships were
between a person in the study and a person without a geno-
typed isolate (e.g., children, clinical patients). Of 92 relation-
ships analyzed (88 persons), 67 (72%) demonstrated exact or
similar (±1 hybridizing band) RFLP matches. Twenty-five
relationships between 38 persons were not supported by geno-
typing, i.e., the isolates had different genotypes.
The 25 expected relationships not supported by genotyping
were as follows: 11 in persons staying at the same homeless
shelter at the same time; 5 in household contacts; 2 in non-
household family members, 3 in friends and social contacts,
and 4 in co-workers. The five relationships involving house-
hold contacts were in persons from countries with a high prev-
alence of TB. These relationships included roommates from
Mali, siblings from Kenya and Ethiopia, and parents and adult
children from China and India.
Additional Epidemiologic Links in 
RFLP Cluster Investigation
In addition to the 129 epidemiologic relationships identi-
fied before RFLP results, 11 unexpected epidemiologic rela-
tionships involving 21 persons were identified. We also
identified additional and some previously unrecognized places
of transmission (Table). Several of these are believed to have
been caused by either casual contact or unsuspected settings.
Table. Settings of transmission for unexpected epidemiologic links within genotyped clusters
Cluster designation 
(no. IS6110 copies)
No. unexpected epidemiologic 
relationships (persons)
No. expected relationships 
(persons)
Settings of transmission for 
unexpected epidemiologic links 
1 (10) 1 (2)  2 (3) Prison 
2 (7) 1 (2)  2 (3) Neighborhood, same public housing 
3 (15) 1 (2) 0 (0) Long-term care facility 
4 (8) 1 (2) 0 (0) Fast food restaurant
5 (12) 2 (3) 0 (0) Hair salon, college building 
6 (1) 1 (2) 0 (0) Buddhist temple 
7 (5) 1 (2) 0 (0) Community barbecuea 
8 (8) 1 (2) 1 (2) Bars 
9 (12) 1 (2) 0 (0) Neighborhood, same markets
10 (9) 1 (2) 0 (0) Neighborhood
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For example, cluster 5 in the table consisted of three patients
who ostensibly had nothing in common. However, RFLP clus-
ter investigation established that one patient had been the hair-
dresser of the second patient, who was a college student. The
third patient was a security guard who had worked in a college
dormitory frequented by the second case. At the onset of the
guard’s illness, he was working at another facility.
Extent of an Outbreak in a Homeless Shelter
Of 18 men with TB in the homeless or associated popula-
tions in 2000, isolates from 15 persons had RFLP pattern 437
or 5309. These patterns differ by a one-copy addition. Thirteen
of the men were long-term users of one shelter, although eight
used the shelter sporadically over many years. Two patients
had positive tuberculin skin tests in the past, and two other
patients were clinical patients in past years (1997 and 1995).
Eleven of the 15 patients were interviewed, and only one inter-
view provided a definite epidemiologic link between two
patients. Other interviews could not establish specific dates
that the cases had overlapped. We reviewed 199 bed logs from
the shelter for October 1999 through June 2000, a time period
between documented negative tuberculin skin tests and diag-
nosis of active disease for three of the patients. 
Of 14 homeless men in the cluster, 2 were not on the bed
logs for the entire 9-month period. The remaining 12 patients
were never all present on the same day. However, 11 of the 12
patients were present on 1 day in November, and 10 of the 12
were present on 6 nights in October and November 1999. Of
15 persons in the cluster (14 guests and 1 employee), we estab-
lished that 13 were epidemiologically linked. Of the other two,
we believe that one man’s diagnosis resulted from a false-pos-
itive culture, and the other man arrived at the shelter after June
2000 and was likely exposed later. 
Laboratory Cross-Contamination
In April and May 1994, two related instances of cross-con-
tamination in one laboratory were identified 3 weeks apart.
Five of ten cultures processed at the same time in the first
instance and three of the ten in the second were submitted for
RFLP analysis; they matched a strain used as a control in the
decontamination and digestion procedure. The TB Division
and the laboratory sent all isolates tested 2 weeks before the
first instance through 2 weeks after the second instance for
RFLP typing. Clinical records were reviewed, and epidemio-
logic follow-up was completed on all cases. No other speci-
mens were affected.
Discussion
We identified unexpected epidemiologic links between 21
known cases of TB (Table). However, over the course of the
study, we did not unearth any new unknown infectious cases of
TB by using genotyping. Two possible explanations for this
lack of new cases include a historically strong programmatic
interest in case finding, or conversely, the difficulty of reopen-
ing contact investigations after substantial time has elapsed. 
Although the Massachusetts TB Division has always prac-
ticed the concentric-circle method of contact investigation,
RFLP typing has identified enough unexpected links and sites
of transmission that we now focus on the time involved in the
case-contact interaction even if that contact is not within the
home or workplace. We have always emphasized the impor-
tance of considering the nonhousehold contact as a means of
disease transmission, and we address the potential of the more
casual contact on the basis some of the unexpected links we
found (such as the student and security guard mentioned previ-
ously). Bishai et al. report that TB transmission continues
despite active case finding and 15 years of directly observed
therapy (20) and suggest that this transmission may have been
in difficult-to-treat populations (such as the homeless) or the
result of casual transmission. Other authors have also com-
mented on the likely importance of casual transmission and the
important role of RFLP typing in documentation (21–23). If
the trend in Maryland noted by Bishai et al. (20) and Sterling
et al. (24) is true in otherwise well-served, financially viable
TB control programs, genotyping of M. tuberculosis isolates
will be essential for public health interventions in these set-
tings. 
Nearly three fourths of our cases did not cluster. Although
the patients with unique patterns in our dataset may have clus-
tered with someone outside of the study (thus underestimating
clustering in our population), the high numbers of unique
cases still suggest that most of our cases are due to reactivation
of latent TB infection. Thus, we should concentrate resources
on early identification of latent TB infection and follow-up to
interrupt TB transmission. In addition, the finding that our
conventional contact investigations were overestimating trans-
mission in persons born in disease-endemic countries supports
the 1998 findings of Behr et al. (25). Isolates from contacts
born in foreign countries were significantly more likely to
have different strains than isolates from contacts born in the
United States (data not shown). This finding suggests that the
public health program makes certain assumptions about the
definition of close contacts that are not correct in every case.
 The utility of genotyping in outbreak response cannot be
overestimated. A strain designated as the genotyping network
pattern 437 has been responsible for 20 cases since 1993. The
strain’s reemergence in the homeless in 2000 was unsuspected,
partly because men who were believed to spend few nights in
homeless shelters were found to have this strain. In addition,
the shelter, identified as a common site for many persons with
TB, had excellent control measures. In this situation, genotyp-
ing provided evidence that warranted a thorough investigation
and the development of new educational materials. Educa-
tional activities were conducted in shelters, emergency rooms,
and other sites; and contacts from a large-scale screening at the
site are being followed. The discovery of other unexpected
clusters has resulted in involving less traditional sites in educa-
tion and prevention efforts. One such educational video about
TB was pilot tested in hairdressing salons in a Massachusetts
community. In addition, genotyping can be applied to situa-TUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
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tions of increased cases to determine that an outbreak is not
occurring, as in Hanau-Bercot et al. (8). Determining that
cases have different genotypes can mean that costly mobiliza-
tion of public health resources to combat an outbreak is unnec-
essary. 
Policies to reduce cross-contamination risks have been
instituted at the laboratory where cross-contamination
occurred in 1994 and 1995. Live control strains are no longer
used to process specimens. When a new patient’s culture
grows five or fewer colonies, laboratory records are reviewed
to establish the likelihood of error. However, because cross-
contamination or other misclassification of a specimen or
result does not rule out the possibility of a TB diagnosis, care
must be taken before attributing a positive culture to error. In
addition, public health programs should be able to prove or
disprove laboratory contamination on a real-time basis for
clinical purposes. This confirmation is important for labora-
tory internal quality control, can result in cost savings of sev-
eral thousand dollars per misdiagnosed patient (19,26), and
can save emotional and other costs to the patient.
Limitations of Genotyping Techniques
In the cluster investigation study, 105 (66%) of 159 per-
sons in clusters were interviewed or had epidemiologic links to
everyone else in their cluster, so they were not interviewed
according to the protocol. Of the remaining 54 (33%), patients
refused to be interviewed (10 patients). An additional 20
patients were defined as “administratively closed” at the end
of the study. These patients did not refuse to participate in the
study but could not be reached after six phone attempts or
three visit attempts.  Several either agreed to participate or
asked to be contacted later but were unreachable. Of 45 clus-
ters investigated as part of the official cluster investigation
study with patients eligible for interview, we interviewed all
persons in 13 clusters. 
The RFLP technique is expensive and technically demand-
ing; it also requires microbiologic expertise and resources to
obtain cultures as well as sophisticated software for RFLP pat-
tern comparison. Thus, turnaround time between specimen
collection and availability of RFLP result may be lengthy (27).
In our study, this turnaround time averaged 7 months, which
may have contributed to our difficulties in obtaining patient
interviews. However, identifying clusters would be a slow pro-
cess even with negligible turnaround times, as latent TB infec-
tion reactivates slowly. Reopening contact investigations after
receipt of RFLP results was impractical in most instances. In
addition, interpreting results is more difficult because of the
lack of specificity in patterns with fewer than seven IS6110
copies. 
A recently reported limitation of RFLP relates to sampling
(28). A certain number of cases in every population cannot be
assigned RFLP types. Either the specimens do not grow M.
tuberculosis, or TB is diagnosed on the basis of clinical infor-
mation without bacteriological confirmation. During the study
period in Massachusetts, RFLP typing provided information
on 95% of our culture-confirmed cases, 77 % of our cases
overall.
RFLP and any other genotyping tool can be useful for TB
control if certain assumptions hold true. M. tuberculosis strains
are relatively stable but not immutable; thus, if persons fall
into a cluster, they probably have the same TB strain. Cluster-
ing implies recent transmission because strains change over
time. A few studies (29–32) have analyzed the stability of
RFLP patterns; one determined that half of the strains will
demonstrate a shift in 3–4 years (29), while another study
found no change (32). Neimann et al. saw almost no change in
patterns among 75 isolates in chains of transmission, i.e., mul-
tiple patients (30). These studies cannot make assumptions
about changes of patterns during latency, and rates of change
of strains may vary. In addition, we assume that clustering in
the TB control program’s population implies recent transmis-
sion and not simply endemic strains with a lack of diversity.
We assume that sampling is complete and that no difference
exists between the patients with or without available isolates
for genotyping. For public health programs to benefit fully
from a genotyping technique, it must be rapid, inexpensive,
and reproducible from laboratory to laboratory. In general, the
currently available DNA fingerprinting tools should be used
only in conjunction with epidemiology. Universal fingerprint-
ing, in particular, shows its greatest utility when the health
department can respond to this new information by allocating
additional resources to conduct investigations of unexpected
clusters (33). Genotyping can then have as great an impact on
public health practice nationwide as it had in Massachusetts. 
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